What happens in Greece will not stay in Greece. Even though the country accounts for only 0.5 per cent of the world's economy, the crash of that profligate nation will have global consequences. The financial irradiation from Greece may be the biggest threat so far to the euro and, indeed, to the European project.
希腊危机的影响不会只局限在本国范围之内。虽然这个恣意挥霍 的国家在全球经济中所占的比重仅为0.5%，但该国危机却将造成全球性后果。希腊财政危机的扩散，或许是欧元乃至欧洲事业迄今为止所面临的最大威胁。
Too much spending, too little tax-collecting and book-cooking are at the core of Greece's troubles. But this is not the entire story: Spain and Ireland are in trouble even though their public debt as a percentage of gross domestic product is much smaller than that of Germany. Italy, also in the financial markets' crosshairs, has high public debt but a lower deficit than the eurozone's average. Good fiscal management did not inoculate Spain against mass unemployment.
希腊问 题的本质，是支出过度、征税太少以及做假账。但这还不是故事的全部：西班牙和爱尔兰目前身处困境，尽管它们的公共债务占国内生产总值(GDP)的比例远低 于德国。意大利也已成为金融市场的靶子，该国背负高额公共债务，但赤字远低于欧元区的平均水平。良好的财政管理并未使西班牙免遭大规模失业的命运。
At the root of these countries' problems is the fact that their prices and wages have risen much faster than those of Germany and other eurozone members. This loss of competitiveness can no longer be compensated for by currency devaluation. Real estate bubbles in Ireland and Spain contributed to the troubles. Wage push and rigid labour laws across most of these vulnerable countries did not help either.
这些国 家问题的根源，在于它们的物价和工资涨幅远高于德国及其它欧元区成员国。如今这种竞争力的损失，已无法再通过货币贬值得到弥补。爱尔兰和西班牙的房地产泡 沫使问题更加严重。这些易受冲击的国家大多实行的加资举措和严格的劳动法也都于事无补。
Since abandoning the euro looks, at least for now, unthinkable, these countries risk years of wage and budget cuts with anaemic growth, high unemployment and deflation.
至少在现在，放弃欧元似乎是不可想象的，有鉴于此，未来许多年里，由于 经济增长疲弱、失业高企和通缩，这些国家可能面临削减工资和预算的前景。
There are ways to mitigate the pain. For example, Germany and other countries could adopt more expansionary fiscal policies for a while. Or, more powerfully, the wider euro area could adopt more expansionary monetary policies for several years. Today, this second option is anathema as the “inflation fundamentalists” will have none of it. This elite of central bankers, top economic officials, politicians, academics and journalists maintains the risks of allowing inflation to climb above 2 per cent are unacceptable.
有一些方法可以减轻痛苦。例如，德国及其它国家可以暂时采取扩张性更 强的财政政策。或者，力度更大一点的话，范围更大的欧元区在数年内可以施行扩张性较强的货币政策。如今，第二种方法是“通胀原教旨主义者” (inflation fundamentalists)所无法忍受的诅咒。这批由中央银行家、高层经济官员、政界和学术界人士以及记者组成的精英坚持认为，通胀超过2%是不能 接受的。
Their view is informed by the disastrous experience with hyper-inflation in Germany in the 1930s and stagflation in industrial countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Undoubtedly, moderate inflation can creep up to become high inflation. But, like many good ideas that take on the mantle of a cult, inflation fundamentalism can hurt. There is little if any empirical evidence that moderate inflation that stays moderate hurts growth. In most countries, cutting actual wages is politically difficult if not altogether impossible. But, to regain competitiveness and balance the books, real wage adjustments are sometimes inevitable. A slightly higher level of inflation allows for this painful adjustment with a lower level of political conflict.
在 上世纪30年代德国恶性通胀和70-80年代工业化国家滞胀的悲惨经历，为上述观点提供了依据。诚然，温和通胀会节节攀升，直至变为高通胀。但是，与许多 披着宗教崇拜外衣的美好想法一样，通胀原教旨主义也可能带来危害。几乎没有任何经验证据表明，温和的通胀会损害增长。在多数国家，从政治上讲，削减实际工 资即便不是完全行不通，也会困难重重。然而有些时候，要重新获得竞争力并实现收支平衡，调整实际工资是势在必行的。通胀水平略有上升，有助于减轻这一痛苦 调整所带来的政治冲突。
Ultra-low inflation, on the other hand, can easily become deflation in a recession. Falling prices encourage people to defer spending, which makes things worse and erodes tax payments, impairing a government's ability to service debt, which in turn increases the debt's size and costs.
另一方面，在衰退时期，超低通胀会很容易转化为通缩。物价持续下跌，会鼓励人们推迟消费，从而使形势恶 化，并导致税收减少，进而削弱政府的偿债能力，反过来也将增加债务的规模和成本。
The harms of inflation fundamentalism do not stop there. A single-minded focus on inflation makes it easy for policymakers to lose sight of the broader picture – asset prices, growth and employment. Policy can become too tight or too loose – as in the run-up to the crisis in the US when low inflation was seen as a comforting sign that things were in order.
通胀原教旨主义的危害不止于此。政策制定者如果一味关注通胀，就容易看不清整体形势，忽视资产 价格、经济增长状况和就业等方面。结果导致政策不是过紧就是过松——美国在本次危机爆发前的情况就是如此，当时的低通胀被认为是形势良好、安然无虞的征 兆。
Very low inflation also reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy when growth slows since interest rates cannot go below zero. In the current crisis, governments were forced to rely too much on fiscal stimulus, and central banks to buy securities directly, taking on more risk themselves, and distorting financial markets.
此外，当经济增长放缓时，超低通 胀会降低货币政策的效力，因为利率无法降至零以下的水平。在本次危机中，各国政府被迫过多地依赖财政刺激手段；各央行被迫直接买入证券，自身承担了更多的 风险，也对金融市场产生了扭曲作用。
The crisis in the euro area underscores the need for a more open-minded discussion of the merits and costs of ultra-low inflation, and Olivier Blanchard, the IMF's chief economist, has just called for consideration of a more moderate (4 per cent) inflation target. This took courage. Coming from what was once the temple of inflation fundamentalism, it is akin to the chief rabbi calling for reconsideration of kosher laws.
欧元区的危机突显出，有必要对超低通胀的利弊展开更开放的讨论。国际货币 基金组织(IMF)首席经济学家奥利维尔•布兰查德(Olivier Blanchard)近期呼吁，应考虑一个更为适度的通胀目标（如4%）。这种做法需要勇气。这番发自昔日通胀原教旨主义圣殿的呼声，简直堪比大拉比（犹 太学者——译者注）在呼吁反思犹太律法。
The reaction of members of the European Central Bank council to Mr Blanchard's proposal? “Playing with fire”, “extremely unhelpful” and even “a satanic error”. The euro crisis and the dismissive reaction to a proposal from a respected source are sure signs that the time for serious scrutiny of inflation fundamentalism has come.
欧洲央行理事会成员对布兰 查德的建议作何反应？他们指责这是“玩火”、“毫无益处”甚至“邪恶的错误”。这场欧元危机以及一位可敬人士的建议遭到轻视的事实确然表明，对通胀原教旨 主义进行严肃审核的时机已经到来。
Uri Dadush is director of international economics at the Carnegie Endowment and Moisés Naím is editor in chief of Foreign Policy magazine
尤里•达杜什(Uri Dadush)是卡内基基金会(Carnegie Endowment)国际经济项目主任，摩西•纳伊姆(Moisés Naím)是《外交政策》(Foreign Policy)杂志的主编